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Abstract 
This paper contributes to the literature on foreign direct investment (FDI) and economic growth in two main 
ways. First, we examine the effect of FDI on economic growth for 44 developing countries over the period 1970 to 
2005  using  heterogeneous  panel  cointegration  techniques  that  are  robust  to  omitted  variables  and  endogenous 
regressors. In contrast to previous studies, we find that FDI has, on average, a negative effect on growth in developing 
countries, but that there are large cross-country differences in the growth effects of FDI. Second, we use a general-to-
specific model selection approach to systematically search for country-specific factors explaining the cross-country 
differences in the growth effects of FDI. Contrary to previous results, we find that the cross-country differences in per 
capita income, human capital, openness, and financial market development cannot explain the cross-country differences 
in the growth effects of FDI. Instead, the growth effects of FDI are positively related to freedom from government 
intervention  and  freedom  from  business  regulation,  and  negatively  related  to  FDI  volatility  and  natural  resource 
dependence. 
 
JEL-Classification: F21; F43; C23; C21 
Keywords: FDI; Growth; Developing countries; Panel cointegration; General-to-specific approach 
 
1. Introduction 
Since the early 1980s, most developing countries have significantly eased restrictions on 
foreign direct investment (FDI) and many have offered seductive tax incentives and subsidies to 
attract foreign capital. The rationale behind this is that FDI contributes to economic growth by 
stimulating capital accumulation and/or through positive externalities in the form of knowledge and 
productivity spillovers to local firms, as theory predicts. But does it really? Skeptics point out, for 
example, that FDI can reduce capital accumulation when foreign investors claim scarce resources, 
such as import licenses, skilled manpower, credit facilities, etc., thereby crowding out investment 
from domestic  sources. Further,  it  is argued that  knowledge spillovers are often  illusory, since 
domestic firms using backward production technology and unskilled workers are typically unable to 
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learn from multinationals. Finally, because multinationals generally have lower marginal costs due 
to some firm specific advantage, critics argue that they can attract demand away from domestic 
firms,  forcing  the  domestic  companies  to  reduce  their  production.  Competition  from  foreign 
companies can thus, paradoxically, reduce the productivity of domestic firms, as some firm-level 
studies suggest (see, e.g., Haddad and Harrison, 1993; Aitken and Harrison, 1999). 
Despite these (and other) concerns, most macroeconomic studies conclude that FDI has a 
positive effect on the economic growth of developing countries. In particular, countries with higher 
levels  of  per  capita  income,  better  educated  workers,  higher  degrees  of  openness,  and  well-
developed financial system seem to benefit significantly from FDI (see, e.g., OECD, 2002). 
This paper challenges that conventional wisdom, arguing that existing studies suffer from 
econometric problems, such as country-specific omitted variables, endogeneity of the regressors, 
cross-country  heterogeneity  in the growth effects of FDI, neglected  long-run  level relationships 
between  FDI  and  output,  and/or  unrepresentative,  small  country  samples.  Consequently,  the 
positive growth effects of FDI as portrayed in existing literature are unreliable. 
The objective of this paper is to address each of these issues and to reassess the relationship 
between FDI and growth. Specifically, we make the following contributions: 
(1)  We employ heterogeneous panel cointegration techniques that are robust to omitted variables 
and endogenous regressors to estimate the long-run level relationship between FDI and output 
for developing countries both individually and as a whole. Given that we consider 44 countries 
over the period from 1970 to 2005, our sample includes more countries over a longer time 
period than the samples used in previous panel (cointegration) studies in this area. To preview 
the main results: We find that FDI has, on average, a robust negative long-run effect on growth 
in developing countries, but that there are large cross-country differences in the growth effects 
of FDI. 
(2)  We adopt a model-selection approach which is based on a general-to-specific methodology to 
systematically search for country-specific conditions that are important factors in explaining 
the cross-country differences in the effects of FDI on economic growth. Our main result is that 
cross-country differences in the growth effects of FDI cannot be explained by cross-country 
differences in per capita income, human capital, openness, or financial market development. 
Instead,  we  find  that  the  effects  of  FDI  on  economic  growth  in  developing  countries  are 
positively  related  to  freedom  from  government  intervention  and  freedom  from  business 
regulation, and negatively related to FDI volatility and natural resource dependence. 
(3)  A methodological contribution of this paper is to use a two-step estimation procedure that 
combines panel and cross-sectional methods: The first step involves estimating the effect of 
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FDI on economic growth for each country using heterogeneous panel estimators. The second 
step involves estimating the determinants of the FDI-growth relationship using cross-sectional 
regressions with the estimated growth effect as the dependent variable. 
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 discusses previous empirical work on this 
topic.  Section  3  reexamines  the  impact  of  FDI  on  economic  growth.  Section  4  analyzes  the 
determinants of the growth effects of FDI. Section 5 concludes. 
  
2. The empirical literature: Review and critique 
There  exists  a  vast  empirical  literature  on  the  effects  of  FDI  on  developing  countries’ 
economic growth. In this section, we review the main contributions and critique the methods used 
therein. First, we discuss cross-country studies on the FDI-growth relationship. Then, we review 
panel studies on FDI and economic growth. Finally, we analyze cointegration studies for individual 
countries and panel cointegration studies on this topic. 
 
2.1. Cross-country studies 
Cross-country  studies  generally  find  evidence  of  a  robust,  positive  effect  of  FDI  on 
economic growth in developing countries. However, the growth impact seems to depend on several 
country-specific factors, such as the level of per capita income, the human capital base, the degree 
of trade openness and the level of financial market development. 
Blomström et al. (1994), for example, use cross-country data for 78 developing countries 
and find that lower income developing countries do not enjoy substantial growth benefits from FDI, 
whereas  higher  income developing  countries do. The authors conclude  from this  finding that a 
certain threshold level of development is necessary to absorb new technology from investment of 
foreign firms. Balasubramanyam et al. (1996), examining a sample of 46 developing countries, find 
that the effects of FDI on growth are stronger for countries that are more open to trade. They argue 
that economies that are more open are likely to both attract a higher volume of FDI and promote 
more efficient utilization thereof than closed  economies.  Borensztein et al. (1998), in turn, use 
cross-country analysis of 69 developing countries and  find that the effect of  FDI on  economic 
growth depends on the level of human capital in the host country. Accordingly, FDI contributes to 
economic growth only  if the  level of  education  is  higher than a certain threshold. And  finally, 
Alfaro et al. (2004), using cross-country data for 71 developing and developed countries, find that 
FDI  plays  an  important  role  in  contributing  to  economic  growth,  but  also  that  the  level  of 
development of local financial markets is crucial for these positive effects to be realized. They 
argue that local firms generally need to reorganize their structure (buy new machines and hire new 
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managers  and  skilled  labor)  to  take  advantage  of  FDI-induced  knowledge  spillovers,  which  is 
difficult to do in underdeveloped financial markets. 
Admittedly, numerous authors emphasize methodological problems with estimating cross-
country growth equations, thus casting serious doubts on the validity of these findings (see, e.g., 
Carkovic and Levine, 2005). One of the main criticisms directed at cross-country studies is the 
implicit  assumption  of  the  existence  of  a  common  economic  structure  and  similar  production 
technologies across countries. In fact, however, production technologies, institutions, and policies 
differ substantially between countries, so that country-specific omitted variables may lead to highly 
misleading  cross-country  regression  results.  Moreover,  a  statistically  significant  relationship 
between FDI and economic growth does not necessarily need to be the result of a causal impact of 
FDI  on  economic  growth.  Given  that  rapid  economic  growth  generally  generates  better  profit 
opportunities for FDI, a positive correlation or coefficient of FDI in the growth equation can be 
equally compatible with causality running from growth to FDI. Accordingly, cross-country studies 
may suffer from serious endogeneity problems (see, e.g., Nair-Reichert and Weinhold, 2001).   
 
2.2. Panel studies 
A solution to these problems is the use of panel estimation techniques. Panel estimation 
makes it possible to account for unobserved country-specific effects, thus eliminating a possible 
source  of  omitted-variable  bias.  Moreover,  by  including  lagged  explanatory  variables,  panel 
procedures  allow  control  for  potential  endogeneity  problems  and,  furthermore,  enable  one  to 
explicitly  test  for  Granger  causality.  Carkovic  and  Levine  (2005),  for  example,  use  the  GMM 
system panel estimator proposed by Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundel and Bond (1998) to 
control  for  the  potential  biases  induced  by  endogeneity  and  omitted  variables.  Using  several 
specifications estimated for a sample of 65 developed and developing countries, they find that FDI 
has no robust effect on growth––even when allowing FDI to affect growth differently depending on 
per capita income, trade openness, education, and domestic financial development. Nevertheless, 
the authors emphasize that FDI is not irrelevant for growth given that the FDI variable turns out to 
be positive and statistically significant in many specifications. 
Busse and Groizard (2008), on the other hand, apply an Arellano and Bond (1991) style 
GMM difference estimator to data for 84 developed and developing countries and find (again) that 
the impact of FDI on economic growth depends on the level of financial development. In addition, 
their results suggest that the growth effect of FDI is negatively related to the level of regulation in 
the host country. Busse and Groizard (2008) explain this finding by arguing that restrictive or costly 
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regulations impede both the allocation of foreign capital to the most productive sectors and the 
creation of linkages with (and spillovers to) local firms. 
A common feature of traditional panel estimators, such as the ones used by Carkovic and 
Levine (2005) and Busse and Groizard (2008), is the homogeneity imposed on slope parameters. 
Recent  advances  in  the  heterogeneous  panel  literature,  however,  suggest  that  estimation  and 
inference in standard dynamic panel models can be misleading when the slope coefficients differ 
across cross-section units. To deal with this problem, Nair-Reichert and Weinhold (2001) use what 
they  refer  to  as  the  mixed  fixed  and  random  coefficient  (MFR)  approach  to  test  for  causality 
between FDI and growth. The MFR approach allows for complete heterogeneity in the coefficients 
for the explanatory variables, thus avoiding the biases induced by possibly incorrect homogeneity 
restrictions. Using a sample of 24 developing countries over the period 1971 to 1995, the authors 
find that FDI has, on average, a positive causal effect on economic growth, but this growth effect is 
(in fact) highly heterogeneous. 
  However, another methodological problem with both cross-country and panel studies is the 
use of the growth rate of output as the dependent variable, while either the level or the growth rate 
of the FDI-to-GDP ratio is used as the explanatory variable. A regression with the growth rate of 
output  on  the  left-hand  side  and  the  level  of  the  FDI-to-GDP  ratio  on  the  right-hand  side  is 
problematic for the following reason: Growth rates are generally stationary while the FDI-to-GDP 
ratio has exhibited a strong positive trend since 1970 for most developing countries, implying that 
there cannot be a stable long-run relationship (over time) between the growth rate of output and the 
level of the FDI-to-GDP ratio. Moreover, such unbalanced regressions do not allow for standard 
statistical inferences, in particular when applied to panel data sets with relatively long time series. 
On the other hand, regression models with the growth rate of output on the left-hand side and the 
growth  rate  of  the  FDI-to-GDP  ratio  preclude  the  possibility  of  a  long-run  or  cointegrating 
relationship between the level of output and the level of FDI, a priori. Ericsson et al. (2001), for 
example, show that the use of growth rates (or first differences) can  lead to  highly  misleading 
conclusions regarding the long-run level relationship between the variables––even in cross-country 
analyses. In addition, and equally important, several recent contributions to the theoretical growth 
literature  focus  on  levels  instead  of  growth  rates.  Acemoglu  and  Ventura  (2002),  for  example, 
present a model in which cross-country differences in technology, investment rates, and economic 
policies  are  associated  with  differences  in  output  levels,  not  growth  rates.  Empirical  models 
including only the growth rate of output exclude such models by assumption. 
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2.3. Cointegration studies 
In response to these criticisms, several studies use cointegration and causality analysis to 
investigate  the  long-run  level  relationship  between  output  and  FDI  for  individual  developing 
countries. Most studies find a positive long-run relationship between the variables with Granger-
causality running from FDI to output or in both directions (see, e.g., Ramírez, 2000; Cuadros et al., 
2004; Xiaohui et al., 2002; Fedderke and Romm, 2006; Liu et al., 2009). Given, however, that these 
studies are focused on analyzing a limited number of major FDI recipients, they do not provide a 
solid basis for general conclusions regarding the overall effects of FDI for developing countries. An 
exception is the study by Herzer et al. (2008), who investigate the FDI-led growth hypothesis for 28 
developing countries over the period 1970 to 2003. Their main result is that there is a long-run 
positive causal relationship from FDI to GDP in only four countries. For one of the 28 countries 
(Ecuador), they actually find evidence of a long-run negative growth effect of FDI. 
However, the failure to find a long-run or cointegrating relationship in the large majority of 
countries may simply be due to the low power inherent in individual (country) cointegration tests. 
Hansen and Rand (2006), for example, employ panel cointegration tests, which have higher power, 
by exploiting both the time-series and cross-sectional dimensions of the data. Using heterogeneous 
panel estimators in a sample of 31 developing countries for the period 1970 to 2000 they find clear 
evidence in favor of cointegration between FDI and GDP. Moreover, their results suggest that FDI 
has a positive long-run effect on GDP, whereas GDP has no long-run effect on FDI. Also, they find 
large differences in the growth effect of FDI across countries. 
Thus, the overall picture that emerges from these studies is that FDI tends to have a positive 
effect on economic growth in developing countries, but this growth effect is very heterogeneous. 
Yet, these studies are limited by two factors. First, since only a relatively small number of countries 
are considered, it remains questionable whether the findings are representative for all developing 
countries. Accordingly, a potential problem with these studies is sample selection. Second, although 
these studies find considerable cross-country differences in the growth effects of FDI, they do not 
provide any insights into the determinants of this heterogeneity. These issues are addressed in the 
following sections. 
 
3. The impact of FDI on economic growth in developing countries 
This  section  investigates the  impact of FDI on  economic growth  for a  large  number of 
developing countries over time. Specifically, we use panel data techniques that allow us  (i) to 
control for omitted variable and endogeneity bias, (ii) to estimate the long-run level relationship 
between  the  FDI-to-GDP  ratio  and  aggregate  output,  and  (iii)  to  detect  possible  cross-country 
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differences  in  the  long-run  growth  effects  of  FDI.  The  analysis  proceeds  as  follows:  first,  we 
describe the empirical model and the data. Then, we investigate the unit root properties of the data. 
Thereafter, we test for the existence of a long-run relationship between GDP and the FDI-to-GDP 
ratio, and then provide estimates of this relationship. Finally, we test for causality between the two 
variables and check the robustness of the results. 
 
3.1. Model and data 
Following previous empirical studies on FDI and economic growth, we consider a bivariate 
model of the form (see, e.g., Hansen and Rand, 2006; Herzer et al., 2008): 
it it i i it GDP FDI t a GDP Log        ) / ( ) ( ,                                                                         (1) 
where  it GDP Log ) (  represents the natural logarithm of real GDP over time periods  T t ..., , 2 , 1   and 
countries  N i ..., , 2 , 1   and  it GDP FDI ) / (  is the FDI-to-GDP ratio (in percent) over the same time 
periods and countries.
1 The reason for using the FDI-to-GDP ratio, rather than the (log) level of 
FDI, is to avoid the simultaneity bias associated with the fact that FDI, via the national income 
accounting identity, is itself a component of GDP. More specifically, a positive correlation between 
FDI and GDP may emerge simply because FDI is part of GDP, rather than because of any extra 
contribution that FDI makes to GDP (see, e.g., Herzer et al., 2008).
2 The coefficient    on the FDI-
to-GDP ratio thus represents the growth effect of FDI that goes beyond the mere change in FDI 
volume, while the ai and ʴit are, respectively, country-specific fixed effects and country-specific 
deterministic time trends, capturing any omitted factors that are relatively stable over time or evolve 
smoothly over time.  
Equation (1) assumes that, in the long-run, permanent changes in the FDI-to-GDP ratio are 
associated with permanent changes in the level of GDP. Econometrically, this implies that both the 
individual time series for GDP and the individual series for the FDI-to-GDP ratio must exhibit unit-
root  behavior  and  that  it GDP FDI ) / (   must  be  cointegrated  with  it GDP Log ) ( .  A  regression 
consisting of two cointegrated variables has a stationary error term,  it  , in turn implying that no 
relevant  integrated variables are omitted; any omitted nonstationary  variable that  is part of the 
                                                        
1 In cointegration studies, an increase in the (log-)level of GDP is generally interpreted as economic growth. In other 
words, an effect on GDP is interpreted as an effect on economic growth. This is theoretically justified since GDP is 
measured in logs. To see this, differentiate Equation (1) and obtain of the growth rate of GDP as a function of the 
change in FDI-to-GDP ratio. Equation (1) thus stipulates that economic growth is associated with a change in the FDI-
to-GDP ratio. 
2 It is common practice in (panel) cointegration studies to regress the (log-) level of GDP on explanatory variables 
relative to GDP. Since many of these studies find a positive relationship between GDP and these variables (see, e.g., 
Christopoulos  and  Tsionas,  2004;  Hansen  and  Rand,  2006;  Herzer,  2008),  there  is  no  reason  to  assume  that  this 
approach induces a spurious negative relationship between the FDI-to-GDP ratio and the (log) level GDP. 
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cointegrating relationship would enter the error term, thereby producing nonstationary residuals and 
thus leading to a failure to detect cointegration. Cointegration estimators are therefore robust (under 
cointegration) to the omission of variables that do not form part of the cointegrating relationship. 
This justifies a reduced form model such as Equation (1) (if cointegrated). 
We  use  net  FDI  data  (as  a  percentage  of  GDP)  from  the  UNCTAD  FDI  database 
(http://www.unctad.org/templates/Page.asp?IntItemID=3277&lang=1)
3 and real GDP data from the 
World Development Indicators 2007 database, and select a panel of developing countries for which 
both  it GDP FDI ) / (  and  it GDP Log ) (  have unit roots. In practice, this means that we eliminate from 
65 developing countries for which FDI and GDP data are available over the entire period from 1970 
to 2005 those countries for which the individual time series do not pass a simple screening for a unit 
root via the ADF and the KPSS tests.
4 In addition, we omit countries with unreliable FDI data. That 
is, we exclude those countries  for which the  UNCTAD FDI data differ  significantly  from  that 
reported in the World Development Indicators. Specifically, we exclude all countries whose net FDI 
data do not have the same sign or are incomplete in the World Development Indicators dataset.
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This sample selection procedure yields a sample of 44 developing countries. 
Of these countries, three are in North Africa (Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia), sixteen are in sub-
Saharan Africa (Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, 
Cameroon, Congo, Democratic Republic of Congo, Kenya,  Malawi, Zambia,  Zimbabwe, South 
Africa), eight are in South America (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Paraguay, Peru, 
Venezuela), seven are in Central America and the Caribbean (Costa Rica, El Salvador, Honduras, 
Mexico, Dominican Republic, Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago), one is in West Asia (Turkey), six are 
in East Asia (Hong Kong, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand), and three are in 
South Asia (India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka). Accordingly, our sample represents all major developing 
areas in the world. Nevertheless, we admit that a complete picture of the developing world would 
require the inclusion of many other countries, in particular, China, which is the largest recipient of 
FDI  flows  among  developing  countries.  But the  availability  (and  reliability)  of  data  limits  our 
choice to these 44. Nonetheless, we emphasize that this sample is a much larger sample of countries 
over a longer time period than those used in previous panel (cointegration) studies. 
 
                                                        
3 Following previous research (see, e.g. Nair-Reichert and Weinhold, 2001; Basu et al, 2003; Hansen and Rand, 2006; 
Herzer et al., 2008) we use net FDI flows, defined as net inflows of investment to acquire a lasting management interest 
(10 percent or more of voting stock) in an enterprise operating in an economy other than that of the investor. It includes 
equity capital, reinvestment of earnings and other long term and short-term capital as shown in the balance of payments. 
4 These countries are: the Central African Republic, Gabon, Liberia, Madagascar, Mauritania, and Panama. 
5  These  countries  are:  Chad,  Bolivia,  Egypt,  Gambia,  Guatemala,  Guyana,  Haiti,  Iran,  North  Korea,  Nicaragua, 
Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Seychelles, Togo, and Uruguay. 
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3.2. Testing for unit-roots 
To ensure that the failure to reject the null hypothesis of a unit root is not simply due to the 
low power inherent in the individual country unit root tests, we compute the panel unit root test 
developed by Im, Pesaran, and Shin (2003) (IPS). This allows us to test the null hypothesis that all 
of the individuals of the panel have a unit root versus the alternative that some fractions are (trend) 








1 ' ,                                                                                     (2) 
where pi is the lag order and zit represents deterministic terms, such as fixed effects or fixed effects 
combined with individual time trends. Accordingly, the null hypothesis of a unit root ( 0 : 0  i H  , 
i  =1, 2, …, N) is tested against the alternative of (trend) stationarity ( 0 : 1  i H  , i = 1, 2, …,  1 N ; 






  ,                                                                                                                   (3)    
where  NT t  is the average of the N (= 44) cross-section ADF t-statistics, μ and ν are, respectively, the 
mean and variance of the average of the individual t-statistics, tabulated by Im, Pesaran, and Shin 
(2003). Table 1 reports the test results for the variables in levels and in first differences. The test 
statistics are unable to reject the hypothesis that all countries have a unit root in levels. Since for the 
first  differences  the  unit  root  hypothesis  can  be  rejected,  we  conclude  that  it GDP FDI ) / (   and 
it GDP Log ) (  are integrated of order one, I(1). Thus, the next step in our analysis is an investigation 
of the cointegration properties of the variables. 
 
Table 1 
Panel unit root tests  
Variable  Deterministic terms
 
 
IPS test statistics  Deterministic terms
 
 
IPS test statistics 
Levels         
Log(GDP)  c, t  -0.98  c  4.84 
(FDI/GDP)  c, t  -1.44  c  0.87 
 
First Differences 
       
Δ Log(GDP)      c  -6.56*** 
Δ(FDI/GDP)      c  -10.66*** 
c (t) indicates that we allow for different intercepts (and/or time trends) for each country. *** denote significance at the 
1% level. Four lags were selected to adjust for autocorrelation. The standardized IPS statistics are distributed as N(0, 1).  
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3.3. Testing for cointegration 
We first test for cointegration using the Pedroni (1999, 2004) approach, which allows for 
both  heterogeneous  cointegrating  vectors  and  short-run  dynamics  across  countries.  It  involves 
estimating the hypothesized cointegrating regression separately for each country and then testing 
the estimated residuals for stationarity using seven test statistics. Four of these test statistics pool 
the autoregressive coefficients across different countries during the unit root test and thus restrict 
the first-order autoregressive parameter to being the same for all countries. Pedroni (1999) refers to 
these statistics as panel cointegration statistics. The other three test statistics are based on averaging 
the individually estimated autoregressive coefficients for each country. Accordingly, these statistics 
allow the autoregressive coefficient to vary across countries and are referred to as  group mean 
panel  cointegration  statistics.  Both the  panel  cointegration  statistics  and  the  group  mean  panel 
cointegration statistics test the null hypothesis  : 0 H  “all of the individuals of the panel are not 
cointegrated.” For the panel statistics, the alternative hypothesis is  : 1 H  “all of the individuals of the 
panel  are  cointegrated,”  while  for  the  group  mean  panel  statistics,  the  alternative  is  : 1 H   “a 
significant portion of the panel members are cointegrated” (see, e.g., Pedroni, 2004). 
The first of the panel cointegration statistics is a non-parametric variance ratio test. The 
second  and  the  third  are  panel  versions  of  the  Phillips  and  Perron  (PP)  rho  and  t-statistic, 
respectively. The fourth statistic is a panel ADF statistic analogous to the Levin et al. (2002) panel 
unit root test. Similarly, the first two of the  group mean panel cointegration statistics are panel 
versions of the Phillips and Perron rho and t-statistic, respectively. The third is a group mean ADF 
test analogous to the IPS (2003) panel unit root test. The standardized distributions of the panel and 
group statistics are given by: 







 ,                                                                                                      (4) 
where φ is the respective panel, or group, statistic, and μ and ν are the expected mean and variance 
of the corresponding statistic, tabulated by Pedroni (1999). 
A  weakness  of  the  Pedroni  (1999,  2004)  approach  is  that  it  requires  that  the  long-run 
cointegrating vector for the variables in levels being equal to the short-run adjustment process for 
the variables in their differences. If this common factor restriction is empirically invalid, residual-
based (panel) cointegration tests may suffer from a significant loss of power (see, e.g., Westerlund, 
2007). Moreover, and perhaps more importantly, residual-based (panel) cointegration tests are not 
invariant to the normalization of the cointegration vector. 
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As an additional test for cointegration, we therefore use the Larsson et al. (2001) procedure, 
which is based on Johansen’s (1995) maximum likelihood approach. Like the Johansen time-series 
cointegration test, the Larsson et al. panel test treats all variables as potentially endogenous, thus 
avoiding the normalization problems inherent to residual-based cointegration tests. In addition, the 
Larsson et al. (2001) procedure does not impose a possibly invalid common factor restriction. It 
involves  estimating  the  Johansen  vector  error  correction  model  for  each  country  and  then 
computing the individual trace statistics  } ) ( ) ( { p H r H LRiT . The null hypothesis is that all countries 
have the same number of cointegrating vectors ri among the p variables  r r rank H i i    ) ( : 0 , and 
the alternative hypothesis is  p rank H i   ) ( : 1 , for all  N i , ... , 1  , where  i  is the long-run matrix 
of  order  p×p.  To test  0 H   against  1 H ,  a  panel  cointegration  rank  trace  test  is  constructed  by 
calculating the average of the N individual trace statistics, 




iT p H r H LR
N 1
} ) ( ) ( {
1
,                                                                       (5) 
and then standardizing it as follows: 
    
) 1 , 0 (
) (
) ( } ) ( ) ( {
} ) ( ) ( { N
Z Var
Z E p H r H LR N





  ,                                        (6)  
where the  mean  ) ( k Z E and  variance  ) ( k Z Var  of the asymptotic trace statistic are tabulated by 
Breitung (2005) for the model we use (the model with a constant and a trend in the cointegrating 
relationship).  As  shown  by  Larsson  et  al.  (2001),  the  standardized  panel  trace  statistic  has  an 
asymptotic standard normal distribution as N and T → ∞. 
For  completeness,  we  also  compute  the  Fischer  statistic  proposed  by  Madalla  and  Wu 




i p ) log( 2  ,                                                                                                                  (7) 
where  pi  is  the  significance  level  (the  p-value)  of  the  trace  statistic  for  country  i.  The  test  is 
distributed as χ
2 with 2×N degrees of freedom. 
Finally,  to  accommodate  certain  forms  of  cross-sectional  dependency  and  the  effect  of 
common  disturbances  that  impact  all  countries  of  the  panel,  we  also  use  data  that  have  been 
demeaned with respect to common time effects; i.e., in place of  it GDP Log ) ( and  it GDP FDI ) / ( , we 
employ: 
t it it GDP Log GDP Log GDP Log ) ( ) ( )' (   , 
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t it it GDP FDI GDP FDI GDP FDI ) / ( ) / ( )' / (   , where  
t GDP Log ) (  =   
 N
i it GDP Log N
1
1 ) ( , and 
  t GDP FDI ) / (  =   
 N
i it GDP FDI N
1
1 ) / ( .                                                                            (8) 
Table 2 reports the results. As can be seen, all test statistics clearly indicate cointegration for 
both  the  unadjusted  and  demeaned  data.  The  standardized  panel  trace  statistic  and  the  Fischer 
statistic clearly support the presence of one cointegrating vector. Also, the Pedroni test statistics 
reject the null of no cointegration at the one-percent level. In particular, the panel cointegration 
statistics decisively reject the null  hypothesis  in favor of the alternative  hypothesis (“all of the 




Panel cointegration tests 
  Panel cointegration statistics  Group mean panel cointegration statistics 
Pedroni (1999)  Unadjusted  Time demeaned  Unadjusted  Time demeaned 
Variance ratio  3.97***  4.22***     
PP rho statistics  -16.38***  -15.14***  -11.03***  -10.06*** 
PP t-statistics  -20.42***  -21.34***  -17.68***  -20.71*** 
ADF t-statistics  -19.35***  -20.17***  -15.36***  -17.25*** 
  Cointegration rank 
  r = 0  r = 1 
Larsson et al. (2001)  Unadjusted  Time demeaned  Unadjusted  Time demeaned 
} ) 2 ( ) ( { H r H LR    9.05***  9.19***  0.50  1.01 
Fisher χ
2 test  230.6***  238.1***  89.27  98.86 
*** indicate a rejection of the null hypothesis of no cointegration at the 1% level. All test statistics are asymptotically 
normally distributed. The panel rank test has a critical value of 2.326 (1.645) at the 1% (5%) level. The Fisher test has a 
critical value of 121.8 (110.9) at the 1% (5%) level. The number of lags was determined by the Schwarz criterion. 
 
3.4. Estimating the long-run relationship 
Having found that there is a long-run relationship between FDI and GDP, the next step in 
our analysis is to estimate the long-run coefficient β. To this end, we use the between-dimension, 
group-mean  panel  DOLS  estimator  suggested  by  Pedroni  (2001).  Pedroni  emphasizes  several 
advantages of using between-dimension group-mean-based estimators over the within-dimension 
approach.  For  example,  it  is  argued  that  the  between-dimension  estimator  allows  for  greater 
flexibility  in  the  presence  of  heterogeneous  cointegrating  vectors,  whereas  under  the  within-
                                                        
6 Given that panel cointegration tests may tend to falsely reject the null of no cointegration if there are cointegrating 
relations among the variables across the countries in the panel (see, e.g., Banerjee et al., 2004), we also tested for cross-
country cointegration in the GDP and the FDI series using the Johansen approach; we found no instances of cross-
country cointegration. 
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dimension approach, the cointegrating vectors are constrained to be the same for each country.  
Another advantage of the between-dimension estimators is that the point estimates provide a more 
useful  interpretation  in  the  case  of  heterogeneous  cointegrating  vectors,  since  they  can  be 
interpreted as the  mean  value of the cointegrating  vectors (which does not apply to the within 
estimators). And finally, the between-dimension estimators suffer from much lower small-sample 
size distortions than is the case with the within-dimension estimators. 
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 ) / ( ) / ( ) ( ,                             (9) 
where Φij are coefficients of lead and lag differences, which account for possible serial correlation 
and endogeneity of the regressor(s), thus yielding unbiased estimates. Accordingly, in contrast to 
cross-sectional and conventional panel approaches, the approach that we use does not require us to 
assume that the FDI variable is exogenous.  
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where  it z   is  the  1 ) 1 ( 2   K   vector  of  regressors  it z   =  ( it GDP FDI ) / (   – 
, ) / ( i GDP FDI , ) / ( K it GDP FDI    …,  K it GDP FDI   ) / ( ),  it s ~ =  i it s s  , and the subscript 1 outside 
the brackets indicates that only the first element of the vector is taken to obtain the pooled slope 
coefficient.  Because  the  expression  following  the  summation  over  the  i  is  identical  to  the 
conventional time series DOLS estimator applied to the ith country of the panel ( i  ˆ ), the between-
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Table 3 reports both the individual country DOLS point estimates and the group-mean point 
estimate.  As  can  be  seen  from  the  table,  the  individual  country  estimates  show  considerable 
heterogeneity in the slope coefficients, ranging from -0.60 (Pakistan) to 0.36 (Cameroon). Such 
heterogeneity was also found by Nair-Reichert and Weinhold (2001) and Hansen and Rand (2006), 
as  discussed  in  Section  2.  However,  in  contrast  to  the  results  by  Nair-Reichert  and  Weinhold 
(2001),  Hansen  and  Rand  (2006)  and  most other  studies,  we  find  that  FDI  has,  on  average,  a 
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statistically significant negative long-run effect on economic growth. The group-mean estimate of 
the coefficient on (FDI/GDP) is -0.0243, implying that an increase in the FDI-to-GDP ratio by one 
percentage  point  decreases  GDP  in  developing  countries  by  0.0243  percent,  on  average. 
















Algeria  -0.0962***  -4.02  Malawi  -0.0165  -1.38 
Argentina  0.0719***  4.15  Malaysia  0.0392***  5.70 
Benin  -0.0520***  -4.13  Mexico  -0.0703**  -2.05 
Brazil  -0.0283**  -2.22  Morocco  -0.0777***  -4.85 
Burkina Faso  -0.0191  -0.49  Niger  0.0941**  2.56 
Cameroon  0.3618***  6.43  Nigeria  0.0445**  2.76 
Chile  0.0676***  3.76  Pakistan  -0.6061***  -5.84 
Colombia  -0.0921***  -4.53  Paraguay  -0.1203**  -2.38 
Congo  -0.0711***  -3.97  Peru  0.0008  0.05 
Congo, Dem. Rep.  -0.2856***  -4.65  Philippines  -0.0563*  -1.99 
Costa Rica  0.0680***  5.05  Senegal  -0.0125  -0.62 
Côte d'Ivoire  0.0485  1.46  Sierra Leone  -0.0659***  -5.53 
Dominican Republic  0.0281*  1.88  Singapore  -0.0530**  -2.68 
Ecuador  -0.0420***  -6.54  South Africa  -0.0199  -1.13 
El Salvador  0.1400***  4.30  Sri Lanka  0.0527***  4.24 
Ghana  0.15290***  5.88  Thailand  -0.0263  -0.36 
Honduras  -0.0454**  -2.42  Trinidad and Tobago  -0.0294**  -2.44 
Hong Kong  -0.0308***  -5.93  Tunisia  0.0372**  2.61 
India  0.1762***  6.33  Turkey  -0.0936*  -1.97 
Indonesia  0.0496**  2.20  Venezuela  0.0345**  2.73 
Jamaica  0.0339*  1.91  Zambia  -0.0176*  -1.78 
Kenya  -0.4503***  -8.47  Zimbabwe  -0.0906**  -2.09 
Group-mean estimator    -0.0243***  -3.09       
*** (**) [*] indicate significance at the 1% (5%) [10%] level. The number of leads and lags was determined by the 
Schwarz criterion. 
 
But  even  the  positive  growth  effects  for  the  individual  countries  are  surprisingly  small 
compared,  for  example,  to  the  expected  impact  of  domestic  investment  in  the  standard  Solow 
model. In the Solow model, in which the capital share is one-third, the elasticity of steady state 
output (per capita) with respect to the savings rate is approximately one-half. Assuming a savings 
rate of around 20 percent, this  implies that a one-percentage point  increase  in the  savings  and 
investment  rate  would  increase  steady-state  output  by  around  2.5  percent.  However,  all  our 
estimates for the growth effects of FDI are significantly lower, which might suggest that FDI is 
generally  not  more  productive  than  domestic  investment  (even  in  the  countries  with  positive 
effects). 
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3.5. Testing for causality 
The above interpretation of the estimation results is based on the assumption that long-run 
causality runs from (FDI /GDP) to GDP. To investigate whether this assumption holds, we enter the 
residuals from the individual DOLS long-run relations,  
  it i i i it t GDP FDI t a GDP Log ec ) / ( ) (       ,                                                                   (13)                    
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where the ci are fixed effects. A significant error correction term implies long-run Granger causality 
from the explanatory to the dependent variables, where long-run Granger non-causality and weak 
exogeneity can be regarded as equivalent (see, e.g., Hall and Milne 1994).  
Following Herzer (2008), we test for weak exogeneity by imposing zero restrictions on the 
insignificant short-run parameters (Гk) and then we decide on the significance of the ʱs. In doing so, 
we reduce the number of parameters and thereby we increase the precision of the weak exogeneity 
tests on the ʱ-coefficients. Since all variables in Equation (14), including ect-1, are I(0) variables, 
conventional t-tests can be used for this purpose. 
Given the low frequency of the data and the small sample size, we start with two lags in the 
VECM, k = 2. However, including lags induces a correlation between the error term and the lagged 
dependent variable, so that standard panel estimation techniques, such as the least square dummy 
variable technique, yield biased and inconsistent estimates. To deal with this problem, we follow 
Christopoulos and Tsionas (2004) and use  3 ) (   it GDP Log ,  4 ) (   it GDP Log , and  3 ) / (   it GDP FDI , 
4 ) / (   it GDP FDI , respectively, as instruments for the lagged dependent variables. After applying 
the general-to-specific model reduction procedure, we obtain the results in Table 4. 
 
Table 4 
Vector error correction model, tests for Granger-causality (instrumental variable estimation) 
Independent variable  Dependent variable:  it GDP Log ) (    Dependent variable:  it GDP FDI ) / (   
1 ) (   it GDP Log   0.0728** (2.68)   
2 ) (   it GDP Log   -0.0573** (-2.11)   
1 ) / (   it GDP FDI     -0.0112*** (-4.02) 
2 ) / (   it GDP FDI      
1  t ec   -0.0089*** (-9.51)  -0.1841 (-1.40) 
Adj. R
2  0.10  0.02 
t-statistics in parentheses. *** indicate significance at the 1% level. Insignificant short-run dynamics were eliminated 
successively according to the lowest t-values. Fixed effects estimates are not reported. 
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According  to the  t-statistics  of  the  error  correction  terms,  the  FDI-to-GDP  ratio  can  be 
regarded  as  weakly  exogenous,  whereas  weak  exogeneity  of  the  GDP  variable  is  decisively 
rejected. Consequently, Log(GDP)it  is the only  variable that  is endogenous  in the cointegrating 
relation and hence Granger-caused by FDI in the long run. In other words, long-run causality is 
unidirectional from FDI to growth, which is in line with the results by Hansen and Rand (2006). 
Since  the  short-run  dynamics  of  FDI  turned  out  to  be  insignificant  in  the  GDP  equation,  we 
conclude that there is no short-run Granger causality from FDI to GDP. Similarly, the lagged first 
differences of the GDP variable were found to be insignificant in the FDI equation, suggesting that 
no short-run causality exists from growth to FDI. 
 
3.6. Robustness 
Since  the  negative  relationship  between  FDI  and  economic  growth  challenges  previous 
econometric work, and since sample selection and structural breaks may influence the coefficient 
estimates, we now check the robustness of the results.  
 
Figure 1 










We  first  examine  whether  outliers  are  responsible  for  the  negative  impact  of  FDI  on 
economic growth. To this end, we reestimate the group-mean coefficient β, excluding one country 
at a time from the sample. The estimated t-statistics on (FDI/GDP)it, along with the ten-percent 
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outliers; the effect of FDI remains negative and statistically significant (at least at the ten-percent 
level). 
Next,  we  reestimate  Equation  (1),  excluding  countries  from  North  Africa,  sub-Saharan 
Africa,  South  America,  Central  America  and  the  Caribbean,  East  Asia,  and  South  Asia.  The 
resulting group-mean values for β are reported in Table 5. Regardless which of these regions is 
excluded from the sample, the relationship between FDI and economic growth remains negative. 
Admittedly,  the  FDI  coefficient  becomes  statistically  insignificant  when  countries  from  sub-
Saharan Africa are excluded, but this is due to the large sample size of this country group. 
 
Table 5 
Group-mean estimation with regional country groups excluded from the sample 
  Coefficient on (FDI/GDP)  t-stat  Number of countries 
Excluding North Africa  -0.0227**  -2.21  41 
Excluding sub-Saharan Africa  -0.0237  -1.20  29 
Excluding South America  -0.0266**  -2.58  36 
Excluding Central America and the Caribbean  -0.0322***  -4.69  37 
Excluding East Asia  -0.0260**  -2.82  38 
Excluding South Asia  -0.0168***  -3.94  41 
*** (**) indicate significance at the 1% (5%) level. The countries included in each region are: North Africa: Algeria, 
Morocco, and Tunisia; sub-Saharan Africa: Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra 
Leone, Cameroon, Congo, Democratic Republic of Congo, Kenya, Malawi, Zambia, Zimbabwe,  and South Africa; 
South America: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Paraguay, Peru, Venezuela; Central America and the 
Caribbean: Costa Rica, El Salvador, Honduras, Mexico, Dominican Republic, Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago; East 
Asia: Hong Kong, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore,  and Thailand; South Asia: India, Pakistan, and Sri 
Lanka. 
 
Finally, we test whether the estimated β-coefficient is biased due to potential unmodeled 
structural breaks in the individual DOLS regressions. To this end, each individual DOLS regression 
is reestimated using step dummy variables for each possible break date in the period of observation. 
Following Ahmed and Rogers (1995), the significance of these dummies is assessed by a sequential 
Wald test, which is χ
2
(1) distributed. If any of the sequentially computed Wald statistics are larger 
than the conventional five-percent critical value of χ
2
(1), the null hypothesis of no structural break 
can  be  rejected.  Accordingly,  the  dates  of  the  potential  structural  breaks  are  identified 
endogenously, i.e., through the testing procedure itself.
7 
We include dummy variables for each break point detected by this procedure, although we 
admit that the sequential Wald test might tend to reject the null of no structural break too often at 
the  (nominal)  five-percent  significance  level,  in  particular  when  the  sample  period  is  short. 
Consequently, the  individual coefficient estimates  may  be biased  by the  inclusion of too many 
                                                        
7 Following common practice, we computed the Wald statistics for each breakpoint in the interval 0.15T – 0.85T. 
17   
dummy variables. Given, however, that the biases might be randomly and equally distributed across 
the countries, we can (again) construct the group-mean panel DOLS estimator for β from the sample 
average of the individual DOLS estimators. Table 6 reports the results. 
 
Table 6 

























Algeria  D91    -0.0721***  -4.27  Malawi  D96    -0.0482***  -3.51 
Argentina  D93    0.0444***  2.86  Malaysia  D85    0.0458***  8.47 
Benin  D75    -0.0596***  -6.00  Mexico  D86    -0.0878***  -3.11 
Brazil  D90    -0.0284**  -2.71  Morocco      -0.0777***  -4.85 
Burkina Faso      -0.0191  -0.49  Niger  D98    0.0688**  2.32 
Cameroon  D95    0.4042***  11.42  Nigeria  D81    0.0237**  2.15 
Chile  D74  D82  0.0319**  2.28  Pakistan  D82    -0.3085***  -3.54 
Colombia  D00    -0.0416*  -1.80  Paraguay  D99    -0.0877**  -2.34 
Congo  D82    -0.0062  -0.37  Peru  D89    0.0281**  2.22 
Congo, Dem Rep. of  D93    -0.1958***  -5.39  Philippines  D84  D00  -0.0746***  -3.27 
Costa Rica  D82    0.0193*  1.99  Senegal  D78    -0.0383**  -2.33 
Côte d' Ivoire  D77    0.0955***  3.94  Sierra Leone      -0.0659***  -5.53 
Dominican Republic  D90    0.0410***  3.75  Singapore      -0.0530**  -2.68 
Ecuador  D83    -0.0526***  -11.73  South Africa  D97    -0.1003***  -4.99 
El Salvador  D81    0.0445**  2.21  Sri Lanka  D88    0.0469***  4.47 
Ghana  D81    0.0892***  3.64  Thailand  D89    -0.1387***  -3.91 
Honduras  D77  D82  -0.0247**  -2.34  Trinidad and Tobago  D84    -0.0383***  -4.20 
Hong Kong  D79  D91  -0.0282***  -9.40  Tunisia  D91    0.0493***  4.66 
India  D79  D88  0.1110***  4.64  Turkey  D79  D87  -0.1869***  -4.79 
Indonesia  D78    0.0876***  6.52  Venezuela      0.0345**  2.73 
Jamaica  D90    0.0436***  3.70  Zambia  D79    -0.0288***  -3.17 
Kenya      -0.4503***  -8.47  Zimbabwe  D77    -0.1371***  -3.60 
Group-mean estimator      -0.0259***  -5.65           
*** (**) [*] indicate significance at the 1% (5%) [10%] level. The number of leads and lags was determined by the 
Schwarz criterion. Dxx is 1 from 19xx (20xx) onwards and 0 otherwise. 
 
As can be seen, the  individual DOLS point estimates  in Table 6 are of about the same 
magnitude as the estimated βis in Table 3. By the way, the correlation between the two sets of FDI 
coefficients is 0.912, suggesting a very similar variation pattern. In addition, a simple F-test fails to 
reject the null hypothesis of equal variances between the estimated βis in Tables 6 and 3 with a p-
value of 0.25. Similarly, the null hypothesis of equal means cannot be rejected with a p-value of 
0.95 using a simple t-test. As a consequence, the group-mean estimate of β in Table 6 (-0.0259) is 
almost identical to the estimated group-mean value in Table 3 (-0.0243), as well. Moreover, both 
FDI coefficients are statistically significant at the one-percent level. 
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All  in  all  we  conclude  from  this  sensitivity  analysis  that the  negative  effect  of  FDI  on 
economic growth in developing countries is robust to outliers, sample size, and potential structural 
breaks. Nevertheless, it must be emphasized that there are large cross-country differences in the 
effects of FDI on a country’s economic growth. 
 
4. The determinants of the growth impact of FDI 
In  this  section,  we  search  for  country-specific  conditions  that  are  important  factors  in 
explaining  the  cross-country  differences  in  the  growth  impact  of  FDI.  Previous  studies  have 
examined this issue in the context of standard growth regressions by including interaction terms 
between FDI and a small number of factors which are a priori assumed to influence the FDI-growth 
relationship. A limitation of the conventional interaction-term approach, however, is the inability to 
empirically identify which independent variable in the interaction term determines the effect of the 
other  independent  variable  on  the  dependent  variable.  For  example,  a  statistically  significant 
interaction term between FDI and human capital does not necessarily imply that the effectiveness of 
FDI aid depends on human capital. A statistically significant FDI-human capital interaction term 
can also be compatible with the growth effect of human capital being influenced by FDI.  
In this section, we follow a different approach: We use a cross-sectional regression model 
with the estimated growth effect as the dependent variable to consider a large number of factors 
possibly affecting the growth effect of FDI. Because we use the growth effect of FDI, rather than 
the growth rate, as the dependent variable, and because we include as many variables as possible 
relevant  to the  growth  effect  of  FDI,  this  approach  is  less  subject  to  endogeneity  and  omitted 
variable bias than the conventional interaction-term approach used in previous studies. 
We proceed as follows: we first describe the variables that we consider to be potentially 
relevant to the FDI-growth relationship and that we use in the empirical analysis. Then, we present 
the empirical analysis. 
 
4.1. Variables and data  
As discussed in Section 2, the previous literature has mainly focused on four variables as 
potential determinants of the FDI-growth relationship. These are: the general level of development, 
trade openness, human capital, and development of local  financial markets. In our analysis, the 
general level of development is represented by real per capita GDP, and the ratio of exports plus 
imports to GDP is the measure for openness employed. The secondary school enrolment rate is used 
as a proxy for human capital, while the ratio of domestic credit to the private sector to GDP is our 
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measure of financial development. We emphasize here that the estimation results do not change 
when alternative measures of financial sector development and/or human capital are used.  
Furthermore, we consider resource dependence to be a possible factor explaining the cross-
country  differences  in  the  growth  effect  of  FDI.  In  resource-rich  countries,  FDI  is  generally 
concentrated in the primary sector, which, by its nature, does not have many linkages with, and 
spillovers  into,  the  economy.  Moreover,  high  FDI  inflows  into  the  primary  sector  can  lead 
economies  to  shift  away  from  competitive  manufacturing  sectors  in  which  many  externalities 
necessary  for growth are generated (see, e.g., Aykut and Sayek, 2007). Thus, FDI  may reduce 
productivity  in  the  long  run  if  it  induces  an  expansion  of  sectors  that  do  not  exhibit  positive 
externalities  while  other  sectors  with  positive  externalities  shrink.  Accordingly,  it  can  be 
hypothesized that the growth effect of FDI depends on the level of resource dependence. Following 
common practice, natural resource dependence is measured by the ratio of primary exports to GDP. 
Next, we consider the possibility that the growth effect of FDI depends on the economic 
significance  of  FDI.  In  fact,  in  many  countries,  FDI  as  a  share  of  GDP  is  very  small,  often 
amounting  to  less  than  one  percent.  Accordingly,  FDI  might  be  simply  too  marginal  in  such 
countries to have a serious growth impact (see, e.g., Herzer, 2008), implying that that the size of the 
growth impact of FDI possibly increases with the economic significance of FDI. To investigate this 
issue, the FDI-to-GDP ratio is included in our analysis. 
We  also  include  the  volatility  of  FDI.  Increased  FDI  volatility  can  lead  to  increased 
macroeconomic uncertainty, which in turn may hamper efforts at economic planning and reduce the 
quantity, as well as efficiency, of domestic investment. On the other hand, economic and political 
instability may discourage FDI, and thus be associated with FDI volatility (see e.g., Lensink and 
Morrissey, 2006). Thus, FDI volatility captures two important aspects that can affect the growth 
effects of FDI: It captures disincentives to investment and it also reflects political and economic 
instability  in  the  broadest  sense.  For the  empirical  analysis,  we  estimate  FDI  volatility  from  a 
GARCH (1, 1) model using the FDI-to-GDP ratio.  
As argued by Herzer et al. (2008) and Busse and Groizard (2008), the growth effects of FDI 
might also depend on the institutional, policy, and regulatory environment in which firms operate. 
To  investigate  the  relevance  of  these  aspects,  we  employ  the  measures  of  economic  freedom 
published by the Heritage Foundation.
8 More specifically, we consider the following indices:  
(1)  Business freedom––this measure assesses the ability to create, operate, and close an enterprise 
quickly and easily. It represents the overall burden, as well as the efficiency, of government 
regulations. 
                                                        
8 http://www.heritage.org/research/features/index/downloads.cfm 
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(2)  Freedom  from  government––this  factor  measures  both  the  government’s  use  of  scarce 
resources  for  its  own  purposes  (government  expenditures,  including  consumption  and 
transfers) and the government’s control over scarce resources through ownership. 
(3)  Property rights––the Property Rights Index measures the ability of individuals to accumulate 
private property, secured by clear laws that are fully enforced by the state. 
(4)  Freedom  from corruption––this  index assesses the perception of corruption  in the  business 
environment, including levels of government legal, judicial, and administrative corruption.   
(5)  Financial  freedom––this  index  measures  the  extent  of  government  regulation  of  financial 
services. 
(6)  Fiscal  freedom––this  is  a  measure  of  the  burden  of  government  from  the  revenue  side.  It 
includes both the tax burden in terms of the top tax rate on income and the overall amount of 
tax burden (as portion of GDP). 
(7)  Investment freedom assesses the restrictions a country imposes on foreign investment.
9 
Finally, we include the inflation rate (based on the consumer price index) as a measure of 
macroeconomic instability and roads per square kilometer to measure infrastructure development. 
The variables and their sources are listed in Table 7. All variables are used in logarithmic form 
except for the dependent variable. The dependent variable is the estimated growth effect of FDI, 
i  ˆ , from Table 3.
10 
 
4.2. Empirical analysis   
To determine which of the above variables are important for explaining the cross-country 
variations in the effect of FDI on economic growth, we use the general-to-specific model selection 
approach suggested by Hoover and Perez (2004). Hoover and Perez show by means of Monte Carlo 
simulations  that  this  approach  is  very  effective  in  identifying  the  true  parameters  of  the  data 
generating process and thus outperforms other variable selection procedures, such as the extreme 
bounds approaches of Levine and Renelt (1992) and Sala-i-Martin (1997). 
Following  the  Hoover  and  Perez  (2004)  approach,  we  start  by  estimating  a  general 
specification, in which all variables from Table 7 are included, and subject the estimated model to a 
series of specification tests. The test battery includes a Jarque-Bera test (JB) for normality of the 
residuals,  a  Ramsey  RESET  test  for  general  nonlinearity  and  functional  form  misspecification 
                                                        
9 See Kane et al. (2007) for a more detailed description of the economic freedoms.  
10 The estimated growth effect of FDI can be interpreted as a time average over the period 1970-2005. Consequently, 
we also use time averages for the independent variables in that period. Exceptions are the economic freedom indices for 
which data before 1995 are not available, so that we are constrained to average these values over the period 1995-2005. 
This should not be a problem since the indices of economic freedom are relatively stable over time. 
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(RESET), a Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey test for heteroscedasticity (HET),
11 and a sub-sample stability 
test (STABILITY) using an F-test for the equality of the variances of the first three-fourths versus the 
last one-fourth of the sample. The results of these tests are presented in the top part of Table 8. They 
show clear evidence of non-normality, misspecification, and parameter instability. 
 
Table 7 
Variables and sources 
Variables  Definition  Source 
Log (GDP)  Log of real per capita GDP (in constant 2000 US dollars). Data averaged 
over the period 1970 to 2005. 
World  Development 
Indicators 2007 
Log(openness)  Log of the ratio of total trade (exports + imports) to GDP. Data averaged 
over the period 1970 to 2005. 
World  Development 
Indicators 2007 
Log(credit)  Log of the private sector bank loans-to-GDP ratio. Data averaged over 
the period 1970 to 2005. 
World  Development 
Indicators 2007 
Log(school)  Log  of  the  secondary  school  enrolment  rate.  Data  averaged  over  the 
period 1970 to 2005. 
World  Development 
Indicators 2007 
Log(primary)  Log of the primary exports-to-GDP ratio. Data averaged over the period 
1970 to 2005. 
World  Development 
Indicators 2007 




Log(volatility)  Log of FDI volatility. Volatility is measured using a GARCH (1, 1) 
model based on the FDI-to-GDP ratio. Data averaged over the period 
1970 to 2005. 
UCTAD FDI 
database 
Log(business)  Log of business freedom. Data averaged over the period 1995 to 2005.  Heritage Foundation 
Log(government)  Log of freedom from government. Data averaged over the period 1995 to 
2005. 
Heritage Foundation 
Log(rights)  Log of property rights. Data averaged over the period 1995 to 2005.  Heritage Foundation 
Log(corruption)  Log of freedom from corruption. Data averaged over the period 1995 to 
2005. 
Heritage Foundation 
Log(financial)  Log of financial freedom. Data averaged over the period 1995 to 2005.  Heritage Foundation 
Log(fiscal)  Log of fiscal freedom. Data averaged over the period 1995 to 2005.  Heritage Foundation 
Log(investment)  Log of investment freedom. Data averaged over the period 1995 to 2005.  Heritage Foundation 
Log(inflation)  Log of the percentage changes in the consumer prices. Data averaged 
over the period 1970 to 2005. 
World  Development 
Indicators 2007 
Log(roads)  Log  of  roads  per  square  kilometer  (km  /  km
2  of  land  mass).  Data 
averaged over the period 1970 to 2005. 





Growth impact of FDI, individual DOLS estimates of the coefficient on 
(FDI/GDP) over the period 1970 to 2005. 
Table 3 
 
However,  we  find  that  Pakistan,  Cameroon,  Ghana,  Kenya,  and  Nigeria  produce  large 
outliers in the residuals. Therefore, we introduce dummy variables for these countries to obtain a 
well-specified equation. The diagnostic test statistics are presented in the bottom of Table 8. They 
suggest that the model is now well specified. The assumption of normally distributed residuals 
                                                        
11 Since an estimated dependent variable may introduce heteroskedasticity into the regressions (see, e.g., Saxonhouse, 
1976), it is particularly important to test for heteroscedasticity. An alternative is to use  White’s heteroskedasticity-
consistent standard errors. Because our models are free from heteroscedasticity, the use of White’s standard errors does 
not change the significance levels. Results are available on request. 
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cannot be rejected, and the RESET test does not suggest nonlinearity or misspecification. The model 




Diagnostic tests: general specification 
Without country dummies   
  JB (χ
2
(2))  60.20 [0.00] 
  RESET (χ
2
(1))  7.14 [0.01] 
  HET   F(16, 27) = 0.50 [0.92] 
  STABILITY  F(10, 32) = 3.74 [0.00] 
With country dummies   
  JB (χ
2
(2))  1.31 [0.52] 
  RESET (χ
2
(1))  0.48 [0.49] 
  HET   F(21, 22) = 0.52 [0.93] 
  STABILITY  F(10, 32) = 1.06 [0.84] 
JB is the Jarque-Bera test for normality, RESET is the usual test for general nonlinearity and misspecification, HET is 
the Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey test for heteroscedasticity, and STABILITY is an F-test for the equality of the variances of 
the first three-fourths versus the last one-fourth of the sample. Numbers in brackets behind the values of the diagnostic 
test statistics are the corresponding p-values. 
 
Next,  we  use  the  general  model  with  country  dummies  and  simplify  it  by  removing 
insignificant variables. To this end, the variables are first ranked according to their t-statistics. We 
then employ five simplification paths in which each of the five variables with the lowest t-statistics 
is the first to be removed. Accordingly, we have five equations. From these equations, variables 
with insignificant coefficients are then eliminated sequentially according to the lowest t-values until 
the remaining variables are significant at the five-percent level. After removal of each variable, the 
above tests of model adequacy are performed. Furthermore, an F-test of the hypothesis that the 
current specification is a valid restriction of the general specification is used after each step. The 
result  is that all of these tests are passed, implying  five well-specified parsimonious equations, 
which are all valid restrictions of the general model. Finally, we construct the non-redundant joint 
model  from  each  of  these  equations  by  taking  all  specifications  and  performing  the  F-test  for 
encompassing the other specifications. This procedure yields the final specification in Table 9. 
As can be seen, the final model passes all the diagnostic tests. Moreover, in Figures 2(a) 
through 2(c), recursive residuals (a), CUSUM (b), and CUSUM of square-tests (c) are presented, 
which unanimously  support a stable  model  for the countries  involved. In addition,  Figure 2(d) 
shows  that  the  final  specification  fits  the  actual  data  very  well  (adjusted  R
2  =  0.80).  Thus, 
statistically valid inferences can be drawn from the regression results in Table 9. 
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Table 9 
General-to-specific approach, final specification 
Independent variable  Dependent variable:  i  ˆ  
Constant  -1.8284*** (-4.21) 
Log(government)  0.3603*** (3.86) 
Log(business)  0.0808** (2.17) 
Log(volatility)  -0.0279*** (-3.05) 
Log(primary)  -0.0187** (-2.32) 
Pakistan dummy  -0.6304*** (-8.80) 
Cameroon dummy  0.3673*** (5.23) 
Ghana dummy  0.2475*** (3.50) 
Kenya dummy  -0.44075*** (-6.18) 
Nigeria dummy  0.2480*** (3.02) 
Diagnostic tests   
Adj. R
2  0.80 
JB (χ
2
(2))  0.53 [0.77] 
RESET (χ
2
(1))  0.23 [0.63] 
HET   F(9, 34) = 0.92 [0.62] 
STABILITY  F(10, 32) = 1.56 [0.33] 
REST  F(11, 22) = 0.66 [0.76] 
t-statistics in parentheses. *** (**) indicate significance at the 1% (5%) level. JB is the Jarque-Bera test for normality, 
RESET is  the usual  test  for  general nonlinearity  and  misspecification,  HET is  the  Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey  test  for 
heteroscedasticity, STABILITY is an F-test for the equality of the variances of the first three-fourths versus the last one-
fourth of the sample, and REST is an F-test of the hypothesis that the model is a valid restriction of the general model. 
Numbers in brackets behind the values of the diagnostic test statistics are the corresponding p-values. 
 
The results  imply that the cross-country  variations  in the growth  impact of  FDI  can  be 
largely  explained  by  cross-country  differences  in  the  level  of  freedom  from  government  and 
business freedom, as well as FDI volatility, and natural resource dependence (measured as the share 
of primary exports in GDP). According to the estimated coefficients, an increase in freedom from 
government by one percent raises the long-run growth impact of FDI by 0.36 percentage points per 
year, and a one percent increase in business freedom is associated with a 0.08 percentage point 
increase in the growth effect of FDI. In contrast, each extra percent of FDI volatility is estimated to 
reduce the impact of FDI on economic growth by 0.0279 percentage points per year. Similarly, a 
one percent increase in the share of primary exports in GDP is associated with a 0.0187 percentage 
point decrease in the growth impact of FDI. 
The  dummy  variables  for  Pakistan  and  Kenya  are  negative,  while  the  dummies  for 
Cameroon, Ghana, and Nigeria are positively related to the long-run growth effect of FDI. Given 
that the dummy variables reflect country-specific characteristics that are not captured by any of the 
variables involved, we admit that the estimated models do not provide a complete picture of the 
potential determinants of the cross-country differences in the growth effect of FDI. 
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Figure 2(a)-(d) 

















Outliers (Pakistan, Cameroon, Ghana, Kenya, and Nigeria) were excluded to compute the recursive residuals and the 
CUSUM and CUSUM of squares statistics. 
 
Another important finding is that the impact of FDI on economic growth does not depend 
(directly) on the level of per capita income in the host country, the human capital base, the degree of 
openness in the economy, or the level of financial market development. All these variables turned 
out to be insignificant and hence were removed from the general model. Consequently, our results 
support Carkovic and Levine (2005), who also find that the impact of FDI on growth does not 
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market development. Our results are also in line with the finding of Busse and Groizard (2008) that 
the growth effect of FDI is negatively related to level of regulation.  
In Table 10, we provide some information about the performance of the variables that were 
omitted  from  the  final  specification.  The  second  column  reports the  t-statistic  of  each  omitted 
variable  when  added  individually  to  the  regression  in  Table  9.  The  last  five  columns  give  an 
indication of the extent to which the omitted variables are collinear with the regressors of the final 
model, showing the pair-wise correlation coefficients (including the t-statistics) and the p-value of 




Effects of adding further regressors individually to the Table 9 regression and correlation coefficients 
Regressor  t-statistic of 
added variable 
Correlation coefficients  p-value of  
F-statistic  
    Log(government)  Log(business)  Log(volatility)  Log(primary)    
Log(openness)  -0.01  0.12 (0.81)  0.39 (2.77)  0.60 (4.92)  -0.07 (-0.82)  0.000 
Log(credit)  1.43  0.01 (0.08)  0.41 (2.94)  0.18 (1.18)  0.02 (1.13)  0.095 
Log(GDP)  -0.31  0.17 (1.14)  0.76 (7.64)  0.48 (3.55)  -0.31 (-2.11)  0.000 
Log(school)  0.06  0.01 (0.09)  0.60 (4.91)  0.38 (2.64)  -0.27 (-0.65)  0.000 
Log(rights)  1.09  0.14 (0.81)  0.71 (6.54)  0.31 (2.13)  -0.11 (-0.72)  0.000 
Log(corruption)  1.22  -0.08 (-0.52)  0.66 (5.64)  0.33 (2.24)  -0.13 (-0.87)  0.000 
Log(inflation)  -0.45  -0.31 (-2.10)  -0.13 (-0.83)  0.07 (0.42)  -0.10 (-0.66)  0.234 
Log(FDI/GDP)  1.27  0.10 (0.64)  0.48 (3.52)  0.81 (9.27)  -0.20 (-1.34)  0.000 
Log(roads)  1.11  0.00 (0.02)  0.53 (4.00)  0.30 (2.13)  -0.13 (-1.28)  0.008 
Log(financial)  -0.56  0.24 (1.60)  0.61 (5.00)  0.20 (1.30)  -0.08 (-0.49)  0.000 
Log(fiscal)  0.44  -0.06 (-0.38)  0.33 (2.31)  0.05 (0.36)  -0.14 (-0.93)  0.201 
Log(investment)  -0.63  0.19 (1.25)  0.55 (4.34)  0.188 (1.24)  -0.17 (-1.09)  0.003 
t-statistics in parentheses. The last column refers to a regression of each variable on the independent variables in Table 
9.  
 
When added individually to the final model, openness is highly insignificant and has an 
unexpected negative sign, while domestic credit to the private sector is only slightly insignificant 
(p-value = 0.16) and has the expected positive coefficient. Similarly, GDP per capita is insignificant 
and has the wrong sign, which is consistent with the results by Carkovic and Levine (2005), who 
find the interaction term between FDI and per capita income to be insignificant and negative in each 
specification.
12 Schooling is insignificant as, for example, in Lensink and Morrissey (2006), while 
Carkovic and Levine (2005) actually find schooling to be statistically significantly negative in four 
out of twelve specifications.  
                                                        
12 In one specification the interaction term is actually significantly negative. 
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However, most of the omitted variables are significantly correlated with the variables in the 
final model, which might suggest that the excluded variables might play an indirect role in the FDI-
growth relationship by affecting or interacting with some of the included variables. In terms of 
individual correlation coefficients, business freedom is highly positively correlated with GDP per 
capita,  schooling,  roads  per  square  kilometer,  freedom  from  corruption,  financial  freedom, 
investment freedom, and property rights. All correlation coefficients are higher than 0.5. Investment 
volatility, in contrast, is highly positively correlated with openness (0.60) and the FDI-to-GDP ratio 
(0.81), which might suggest that these two variables have an indirect negative effect on the FDI-
growth  relationship  through  increased  investment  volatility  (although  the  FDI-to-GDP  ratio  is 
overall positively related to the growth impact of FDI (see Table 10, column 2)). On the other hand, 
freedom from government and the share of primary exports in GDP do not have strong correlations 
with any of the excluded variables. 
Taken together, these findings suggest that cross-country variations in the growth effects of 
FDI  can  largely  be  explained  by  cross-country  differences  in  freedom  from  government 
intervention, business freedom, FDI volatility, and resource dependence. This, however, does not 
imply that all other variables are irrelevant for exploiting the potential of FDI to affect growth. 
There are several factors––such as the level of per capita income, human capital, property rights and 
freedom from corruption––that are correlated with freedom from government, business freedom, 
FDI volatility and resource dependence and thus are likely to play an important indirect role in the 
relationship between FDI and growth. 
 
5. Conclusion 
The  results  reported  in  this  paper  challenge  the  current  belief  that  FDI  generally  has  a 
positive effect on economic growth in developing countries. We first examined the nature of the 
growth effect of FDI using panel cointegration techniques that are specifically designed to deal with 
key problems plaguing previous studies of the FDI-growth nexus: omitted variables, endogeneity, 
cross-country  heterogeneity  and  neglected  long-run  level  relationships.  Employing  data  for  44 
developing countries over the period 1970 to 2005, we found that the effect of FDI on economic 
growth in developing countries is negative on average. This finding is robust to outliers, sample 
size, and potential structural breaks. Nevertheless, there are large cross-country differences in the 
effects of FDI on economic growth. 
Next, we used a general-to-specific model selection approach to identify country-specific 
factors explaining the differences in the growth effects of FDI. The results are clear: Cross-country 
differences in the growth effects of FDI cannot be explained by cross-country differences in per 
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capita income, human capital, openness, and financial market development. Instead, we found that 
the growth effects of FDI depend positively on levels of freedom from government intervention and 
freedom  from  business  regulation,  and  negatively  on  FDI  volatility  and  natural  resource 
dependence. Nevertheless, there are several factors, such as the level of per capita income, property 
rights, and freedom from corruption, that are correlated with freedom from government, business 
freedom,  FDI  volatility,  and  resource  dependence,  suggesting  that  these  factors  do  play  an 
important indirect role in the FDI-growth relationship. 
Our conclusion is that although the current effect of FDI on economic growth in developing 
countries is negative on average, the future impact need not necessarily be negative. Economic 
reforms aimed at 
(i)  improving resource allocation by eliminating market-distorting policies, 
(ii)  minimizing the regulatory burden on business,  
(iii)  reducing FDI volatility by increasing political and economic stability, and  
(iv)  removing natural resource dependence by diversifying the economy 
can protect developing countries from the negative consequences of FDI and induce FDI-led growth 
in the long run.  
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